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ALLOCATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS IN AIR SPACE

Air transportation, an industry most vital to our nation, cannot tolerate
the hazard of surface structures interfering with flight space. Surface owners,
however, have substantial property interests in the airspace above their land.
In a sense, then, the problem of constructing adequate airways is analogous
to the task of building safe and efficient highways. The purpose of this note
is to sketch the conflict between public and private interests in airspace and
to analyze the federal and state response to the problem.
INTERESTS INVOLVED IN AIRSPACE AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE

Significant congressional action regarding use of airspace dates from the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1988,1 which declared all "navigable airspace" to be
subject to the right of free transit by the public. 2 Navigable airspace was
defined as the airspace above the "minimum altitudes of flight" established
by the Civil Aeronautics Authority.3 It was not clear whether Congress intended by this declaration to set aside, without compensation, such navigable
airspace to be thereafter in the public domain, or merely intended to declare
a policy whereby taking by eminent domain, with compensation, could occur
in the future.
The first case involving use of airspace to reach the United States Supreme
Court, United States v. Causby,1 articulated only the character of a surface
owner's interest in the airspace above his land. The Court skirted the question
of the meaning of navigable airspace, carefully noting that the particular
flights involved - landings and take-offs - were not within navigable airspace. 5 The surface owner's interest, said the Court, extended to at least as
much of the space above the ground as he could use or occupy in connection
with the land. 6 But more important, the surface owner's interest included
that airspace necessary to enjoy the beneficial use of the ground, even though
such airspace was not physically occupied. The Court noted that the flights
of Government aircraft were so low and frequent as to constitute a direct
interference with the enjoyment of the land and thus were "as much an ap'
propriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it."
Causby was thus entitled to compensation.
Apparently in response to Causby, Congress amended the definition of
navigable airspace in the Federal Aviation Act of 19588 to include such airI. Ch. 601, §§1-1110, 52 Stat. 973.
2. Id. §3 (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §1304 (1964)).
3. Id. §1 (24) (now Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §1301 (1964)).

4. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
5. Id. at 263.
6. Id. at 264.
7. Id. at 264, 266. Causby is a progenitor of the so-called "inverse condemnation" cases.
"Inverse condemnation" is "a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover
the value of property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even
though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the
taking agency." City of Jacksonville v. Schumann, 167 So. 2d 95, 98 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
8. 49 U.S.C. §§1301-1542 (1964).
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space as is necessary to insure safety in take-off and landing of aircraft.9 But
the precise meaning of navigable airspace remained unclear until Griggs v.
County of Allegheny.1o In that case, the annoying flights were again takeoffs and landings over the plaintiff's land, but the flights were definitely within
navigable airspace since they were within the "minimum safe altitudes."1
The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the surface owner was entitled
to reasonable compensation for the air easement thus appropriated.12 Apparently then, in light of Causby and Griggs, the congressional declaration
of navigable airspace 13 must mean only that where public and private interests
conflict, the public interest must prevail, but just compensation must be given
for the private interests that are appropriated to public use.
Articulation of the various rights to airspace is, of course, only a necessary
preliminary step to the broader problem of reconciling these conflicting
interests. Unfortunately, the steps toward reconciliation taken by Congress
have, in effect, amounted to nonaction. The Federal Aviation Agency (FAA),
the body responsible for effectuation of congressional policy on airspace
use, 14 has promulgated various standards to insure a safe, efficient flow of
air commerce. Part 77 of the FederalAviation Regulations- Objects Affecting
Navigable Airspace - applies to surface structures that rise more than 200
feet above the ground, regardless of whether they extend into navigable
airspace.16

Any such structure may come under FAA scrutiny and may be found to
be a hazard to air navigation.17 But the remedies available to the FAA to
cope with these hazards are seriously inadequate.18 First, the FAA may appeal
9. Id. §1301 (24) (1964).
10. 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
11. Id. at 86. The Court said that a plane flying over plaintiff's house could come
within 11.36 feet of his chimney and still be in the navigable airspace. Id. at 86, 87.
FAA prescriptions of the "minimum safe altitudes of flight" may be found in FAA Regs.,
14 C.F.R. §91.79 (1967). The Court acknowledged further that navigable airspace was in
the "public domain" on the basis of the congressional declaration of policy in the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §1304 (1964).
12. The Court rejected the argument that flights in navigable airspace could not
be the basis for a taking of private property. This argument was presented in Brief for
the Port of Seattle as Amicus Curiae at 9, 10, 11, Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S.
84 (1964).
13. 49 U.S.C. §1304 (1964).
14. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§1341-55 (1964).
15. FAA Regs., 14 C.F.R. §§77.01-.75 (1967).
16. FAA Regs., 14 C.F.R. §77.11 (1967).
17. The procedure followed by the FAA in such circumstances is set out in the FAA
Regs., 14 C.F.R. § §77.13 (a), .31-.39, .41 (1967).
18. Referring to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, establishing the FAA, the Administrator of FAA points out: "That Act does not contain a basis for the mandatory marking
and lighting of structures to warn pilots of aircraft of those structures. Neither does it
contain specific authorization for regulations which would limit the heights of structures.
To date, no judicial decision has been issued on the extent to which ground structures
may constitute an unlawful interference with the public right of freedom of transit through
the navigable airspace recognized by Section 104 of the Act. Until authoritative guidance
is received on that point or express legislative authority is conferred, the Agency measures
in the field of ground hazards to air navigation will be limited to the areas presently
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to the landowner's sense of sportsmanship to modify the structure to meet
FAA standards. 19 Should the landowner fail to respond, the FAA may then
20
change aircraft routes and raise the minimum take-off and approach angles.
Of course, this is no solution at all in an era when most major airports must
use every square yard of available space in an attempt to handle normal
traffic with a minimum of safety and efficiency. Third, in the case of federal
airports, surrounding property and air easements may be purchased. 2 1 This
is certainly a viable solution, but presently it solves only the problem for
military airbases. With regard to civilian airports, the FAA must rely upon
the ability of each state to resolve the problems of airspace. The FAA may
encourage states either to prohibit hazards by zoning or to purchase air
easements..2 2 Unfortunately, neither method is a practical remedy for local
authorities to handle.
STATE REGULATION OF SURFACE HAzARDs: THE INADEQUACY OF ZONING

Many states rely on zoning ordinances to prevent surface hazards surrounding airports. Some have enacted legislation that authorizes political
subdivisions to zone against airport hazards. 23 Use of zoning restrictions by
local authorities is apparently sanctioned not only by part 77 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations, but also by language in the Federal Aid to Airport
24
Act, which suggests zoning where "appropriate."
Such zoning, however, has been attacked by the affected property owners
as unconstitutional "taking" without compensation, in violation of fourteenth
amendment due process. Local governmental units counter that it is simply
"regulation" in the public interest.25 The United States Supreme Court has
enunciated two tests to distinguish a valid regulation from a taking for
which compensation must be given. One test was articulated by the first Mr.
Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas.26 In that case, a brewery owner asserted that statutes prohibiting the manufacture of liquor in the state destroyed
the value of his property and therefore could not validly be enforced without'
covered in Part 77." FAA Administrator N.E. Halsby, Introduction to pt. 77 FAA Regs.,
30 Fed. Reg. 1839 (1965) (emphasis added).
19. See Roosevelt Field v. Town of North Hempstead, 88 F. Supp. 177, 182 (E.D.N.Y.
1950), citing letter from CAA (Civil Aeronautics Authority), which was the predecessor
of the FAA and handled the case.
20. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §1348 (1964).
21. Id. §§1344 (c), 1349 (1964).
22. The FAA's power to control federal aid to airports, Federal Aid to Airports Act,
49 U.S.C. §1110 (1964), is a strong inducement to enforce compliance with FAA decisions.
23. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 4, §§63-67 (1965); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§440485.00-.14 (Deering
1954); FLA. STAT. §§333.01-.14 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. §14-422 (1964). See also 2 E. YoKmy,
ZONING LAW AND PRACtXcE §207 (3d ed. 1953) containing a model airport zoning statute.
24. 49 U.S.C. §1110 (4) (1964).
25. In other zoning situations, not involving airports, height restrictions have been
sustained when reasonably related to public health, safety, and welfare. E.g., Welch v.
Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909). See also the cases reviewed in Validity of Building Height Restrictions,8 A.L.R.2d 963 (1949).
26. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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compensation to him. Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Harlan disagreed. The claimant had merely sustained a limitation upon certain uses
of his property, which were injurious to public welfare.2 7 A "taking" had not
occurred since there was no appropriation to public use.
The "taking-regulation" dichotomy appears to be the test used by the
majority of cases dealing with airport zoning28 The result is that most state
decisions have, on due process grounds, totally invalidated height zoning
restrictions intended to prevent the erection of structures near an airport.
Rice v. City of Newark29 and Yara Engineering Corp. v. City of Newark3 °

for example, held that a state statute, empowering political subdivisions to
zone, did not authorize airport zoning unless it was specifically set out in the
31
statute. In Yara, the New Jersey Supreme Court elaborated by saying:
The City may not under the guise of an ordinance acquire rights in
private property which it may only acquire by purchase or by the
exercise of its power of eminent domain.
2
More recently, the Supreme Court of Idaho in Roark v. City of Caldwell
invalidated an ordinance that not only prohibited the use of plaintiff's land
bordering on the city airport for any but agricultural purposes, but also prohibited the erection of structures of varying heights.
The application of Mr. Justice Harlan's test to airport zoning cases is also
apparent in Sneed v. County of Riverside.33 In that decision a county zoning
ordinance restricting the height of structures on land surrounding an airport
in California was declared unconstitutional as a "taking" without compensa34
tion. The court reasoned:

[T]here is a distinction between the commonly accepted and traditional height restriction zoning regulation of buildings and zoning
of airport approaches in that the latter contemplates actual use of the
airspace zoned, by aircraft, whereas in the building cases there is no
invasion or trespass to the area above the restricted zone.
A second test of the constitutional validity of zoning regulations, employed by a minority of states to uphold airport zoning statutes, was formu27. Mr. Justice Harlan's approach was further explained by Mr. Justice Brandeis: "The
property so restricted remains in the possession of its owner. The State does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The State merely prevents the owner from making a use
which interferes with paramount rights of the public." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28. Justice Harlan's distinction between "regulation" and "taking" seems especially
useful in height zoning cases for two reasons. First, the private loss is occasioned by the
Government acting in a proprietary capacity. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 39 (1964). Second, the air easement created by governmental regulation is necessarily an addition to the assets of the air industry, a public enterprise.
29. 132 N.J.L. 387, 40 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
30. 132 N.J.L. 370, 40 A.2d 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
31. Id. at 373, 40 A.2d at 561.
32. 87 Idaho 557, 394 P.2d 641 (1964).
33. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
34. Id. at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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lated by Mr. Justice Holmes. 35 Holmes felt there was a continuum of interaction between private property interests and public needs; zoning regulations
would thus be judged by the degree of impact they had on the owner's use
38
of his property.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Harrell's Candy Kitchen v. Sarasota-ManateeAirport Authority37 is one of the leading cases applying Holmes's
approach to airport zoning.38 In that case, vertical zoning ordinances were
imposed pursuant to a state statute39 on property adjacent to a local airfield.
On the defendant's land, buildings were not to exceed 27.64 feet. The defendant, however, planned a building that was to be 41 feet high, due primarily to an ornamental roof. The court ruled that the zoning regulation
was constitutional for the owner had not been deprived of the beneficial use
of land to such an extent that the constitutional prohibition against the
taking of property without compensation had been violated. A building
without the ornamental roof was said to be just as suitable for the desired
purpose as was the proposed structure.
The minority position may be reconciled with the majority result, however. For although zoning ordinances were upheld under a general attack,
the minority courts were not entirely convinced that zoning was the proper
remedy for all possible airport hazards. The inference can readily be drawn
that, in other cases, substantial harm to a property owner may transform a
zoning regulation into an unconstitutional taking. Thus, even under the
favorable minority view, airport zoning -which seeks to avoid the burden of
paying substantial compensation to surface owners- would fail where it is
needed most. It would therefore seem that airport zoning is not a feasible
method to insure safe unobstructed airspace.
AcQuIsrrIoN oF AIR

EASEMENTS: THE FEDERAL EXAMPLE

Since zoning is an inadequate solution, states must formulate standards
for the acquisition and purchase of public air easements. The federal government's practice regarding military airbases may then become an important
and persuasive example to guide the states.40 Specifically, the federal example
is helpful to indicate the kinds of easements that may be acquired, the
problem of determining when a taking occurs, the method of computing
compensation, and the persons who have standing to sue for compensation.
35. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
36. Id. at 415-16.
37. 111 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 1959).
38. See also Baggett v. City of Montgomery, 276 Ala. 166, 170, 160 So. 2d 6, 9 (1963);
Waring v. Peterson, 137 So. 2d 268, 272 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
39. FLA. STAT. §333.03 (1965).
40. The federal government is authorized to condemn and purchase easements. 40
U.S.C. §258 (a) (1964). Courts have granted recovery to the injured landowner when the
Government fails to purchase the easement. E.g., United States v. Brondum, 272 F.2d 642
(5th Cir. 1959); Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Aaron v. United States,
311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Klein v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 221 (1961); Highland Park
v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
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Two types of air easements may be acquired: "clearance" easements and
"avigation" easements. The purchaser of a clearance easement takes a perpetual right to clear a determined portion of airspace of natural growth or
structures and to prohibit future obstructions. 4 1 An avigation easement gives
the taker the same rights to unobstructed airspace, but compensates the
landowner, in addition to compensation for the airspace itself, for proximity
damages - damages that result from noise and danger incident to low level
flight over the property.
Pinpointing the precise time that taking occurs is crucial in inverse condemnation cases, for that moment marks the starting point for the statute
of limitations. The leading case in this area, involving a suit for compensation for land flooded by a federal reservoir, is United States v. Dickinson.42
In that decision, the federal statute of limitations was six years. 43 Suit was
brought more than six years after the water had begun to rise onto the land,
but less than six years after it had reached its final level. In allowing the
suit, the Supreme Court reasoned it was not unreasonable for the owner to
delay bringing suit until the final consequences of the flooding were manifest; for a premature suit might result in a denial of ultimate damages due
to res judicata. 44 The statute of limitations would thus run from the date
when the highest level was reached.
The Dickinson reasoning was applied to the taking of flight easements in
Aaron v. United States. 45 The plaintiff's land had been subjected to several
overflights per day in 1952 and early 1953. By late 1953 the flights had increased to ten or twelve a day. Citing Dickinson, the United States Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations began to run in August 1953, because that was the date of the first serious impairmant of the owner's use
46
of the land.
General guidelines for computing just compensation4 7for the taking of an
air easement were set forth in United States v. Causby:
It is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of the
value of the property taken. Market value fairly determined is the
normal measure of the recovery. And that value may reflect the use to
which the land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.
Where less than the total use of the land is destroyed, the difference between
the market value before and after the taking is the general measure of re-

41. United States v. Brondum, 272 F.2d 642 (5th Cir. 1959).
42. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
43. 28 U.S.C. §2041 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1966).
44. Res judicata is not really a threat to the landowner, however. Even though the
Government purchases one air easement an increase in the number of flights over the
land, Davis v. United States, 295 F.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1961), or the use of a new type of aircraft, Avery v. United States, 330 F.2d 640 (Ct. CI. 1964), may give rise to a second taking.
45. 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
46. Id. at 800, 801.
47. 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
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covery.48 In Highland Park v. United States,49 the plaintiff purchased tracts
of land abutting a military airfield for 35,000 dollars, with the intention of
subdividing them for residential use. After several homes were constructed
and sold, the Air Force began using the airfield for flights of heavy jet
bombers. The Court found that the jet flights over the plaintiff's property
constituted a taking and that the property was reduced in value to 20,600
dollars. The market value of the developed portion of the tract was established by expert appraisal, and the value of the undeveloped portion was
determined by allowing the owner a profit of fifty per cent of the purchase
price on the undeveloped portion of the tract; thus, the total value at the
time of taking was appraised at 85,270 dollars. From that figure was subtracted the residual value of the land, leaving the amount of compensation
5
to be 64,570 dollars. 0
Only the owner whose property is subjected to direct overflights has standing to sue for inverse condemnation of an avigation easement. The owner
of adjacent property is denied recovery because there has been no trespass
resulting in a taking. 51 Denial of recovery for a taking simply on the basis
of property lines seems conceptually inconsistent with the reason for granting
recovery at all. Recovery in the avigation easement cases has been based on
substantial interference with property on the ground. Surely noise, vibration,
and possible danger caused by low flights interferes with adjacent property
to the same degree that it interferes with property directly in the line of
flight.
CONCLUSION

There are three possible takers of the airspace: airlines, airport authorities,
and the FAA. The airlines should be quickly disregarded as a taking agency,
however, for they are not the exclusive beneficiaries of the taking. Further,
they do not have the power of eminent domain necessary to acquire the
essential property interest. Courts thus usually hold the airport authorities
to be the taking agency. 52 The reasoning appears to be that the airport
authority is the body most responsible for planning, since the authority
48. United States v. Welsh, 217 U.S. 333(1910). Although Welsh does not deal with
aireasements, it is the leading case on the general measure of recovery.
49. 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
50. Id. at 601. Another method was used in Rice v. City of Newark, 132 N.J.L. 387,
40 A.2d 561 (Sup. Ct. 1945), where valuation was based on tax assessment.
51. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962). See Freeman v. United
States, 167 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1958) (flights alongside the plaintiff's land). In Pope
v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 36 (N.D. Tex. 1959), the complaint was based on operation
of an engine test cell by the Air Force. The court found no taking because the test cell
did not encroach on the plaintiff's land. Nuclear detonations by the Atomic Energy Commission at a site removed from plaintiff's property was held not a taking in Bartholomae
Corp. v. United States, 253 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1957). See also Highland Park, Inc. v. United
States, 161 F. Supp. 597 (Ct. Cl. 1958); Herring v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 769 (Ct. Cl.
1958); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
52. Griggs v. County Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
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makes the initial decisions to build the airport and to select the site. Most
major airports, however, are operated by political subdivisions of the states
and often lack funds sufficient to acquire the necessary extensive interests in
property surrounding the airports.
It is therefore submitted that it is more reasonable for the federal government, through the FAA, to be the one to compensate the surface owner
when flights in navigable airspace result in a taking. The federal government
is authorized by the Constitution to insure the free flow of interstate commerce in both navigable waters and navigable airspace. 3
The declaration of what constitutes navigable airspace is an exercise
of the same source of power, the interstate commerce clause, as that
under which Congress has long declared in many acts what constitutes
navigable and nonnavigable waters. The public right of flight in
the navigable airspace owes its source to the same constitutional bases
which, under decisions of the Supreme Court, has given rise to a public
easement of navigation in the navigable waters of the United States,
regardless of the ownership of the adjacent or subjacent soil.
When private property interests are taken to make waters navigable, the Government has been held liable. 54 Why should it be liable for a taking in
navigable waters and not in navigable airspace?
Congress has recognized that local authorities might have difficulty
shouldering the financial burden of taking easements and thus, in the Federal
Aid to Airports Act 5 5 has provided funds for the acquisition of easements

and other necessary interests in airspace. This program, if augmented with
sufficient funds, may prove to be an adequate solution. However, the present
extensive involvement of the federal government in fostering air commerce
through the FAA, in addition to its traditional preeminence in the area of
interstate commerce, argues for direct federal procedures to acquire the
necessary property interests.
Perhaps the most desirable solution would be for the FAA to be empowered to prevent erection of any hazard extending into navigable airspace
and to regulate development of the surface in such a way that it does not impede safe air navigation. An adjunct of such federal regulation would be
federal responsibility for compensable losses sustained because of the regulation.
WILLIAM TRACY HAVERFIELD
STEPHEN EDWARD DALTON
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54. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).

55. 49 U.S.C. §1110 (1964).
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